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ABSTRACT
This article deals with traitor tracing which is also known as active
fingerprinting, content serialization, or user forensics. We study the
impact of worst case attacks on the well-known Tardos binary prob-
abilistic traitor tracing code, and especially its optimum setups re-
cently advised by Amiri and Tardos, and by Huang andMoulin. This
paper assesses that these optimum setups are robust in the sense that
a discrepancy between the foreseen numbers of colluders and the its
actual value doesn’t spoil the achievable rate of a joint decoder. On
the other hand, this discrepancy might have a dramatic impact on a
single decoder. Since the complexity of the today’s joint decoder is
prohibitive, this paper mitigates the interest of the optimum setups.
Index Terms— traitor tracing, worst case attacks
1. INTRODUCTION
The beginning of the year 2009 witnessed a major breakthrough in
probabilistic traitor tracing codes showing how to achieve the opti-
mum performances against a collusion of c dishonest users. In 2003,
Gabor Tardos proposed a family of provably good codes. Two very
recents and independents works show how to fine-tune this code to
achieve the fingerprinting capacity [1, 2]. The main difficulty is that
the collusion has an infinite number of attacks, ie. ways of mixing
their contents in order to forge the pirated copy. Therefore, the per-
formances must be guaranteed even for the worst case attack (WCA).
On the other hand, the designer of the code can tune the time-sharing
parameter distribution in order to maximize the performances of the
code. The two recent works cast this problem in the game theory
field where the pay-off function is the rate of a joint decoder, ie. the
mutual information between the pirated sequence and the group of
c colluders’ codewords. The major result is that there is indeed a
saddle point defined by the equilibrium attack and time-sharing pa-
rameter. The collusion and the designer of the code have no interest
to divert from this equilibrium point. The pay-off function at the
equilibrium is by definition the fingerprinting capacity. Moreover,
Amiri and Tardos proposed a decoding algorithm taking full advan-
tage of this optimum rate [1].
The goal of this paper is to mitigate these results. Our first argu-
ment is that the pay-off function used in these works is the capacity
bounding the performances of a joint decoder. A joint decoder an-
alyzes groups of c users, as the one proposed by Amiri and Tardos.
Its complexity is simply unaffordable. From the number of the basic
operations to process one group given in [1, Sec. 7], and assuming
that there are c = 4 pirates, the decoder would require some months
to process n = 100, 000 users or several dozens of centuries to pro-
cess one million of users when run on a IBM RoadRunner, which
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is the most powerful computer on Earth today! As far as we know,
the only affordable accusation process is the single decoder, whose
performances are bounded by the mutual information between the
pirated sequence and one codeword. In other word, we propose to
change the pay-off function.
The second argument is that the capacity achieving setup given
in [1, 2] is strongly dependent on the size of collusion. In other
words, the designer of the code must foresee in advance the number
of pirates, or at least commit to a maximum number. This paper
shows three important points:
• For the joint decoder, a mismatch between the foreseen collu-
sion size and the real number of colluders is not at all a matter.
The optimum setup is in a way robust.
• For the the single decoder, with the new pay-off function, this
optimum setup can be very dangerous if the expected number
of colluders is wrong. In certain circumstances, the rate can-
cels so that any single decoder will fail in reliably accusing.
• On the other hand, the Tardos and the flat distributions have
an achievable rate closed to the capacity wrt joint decoding,
and a gracefully decreasing achievable rate wrt to single de-
coding.
The demonstration of these three points is based on the study of the
worst case attack (WCA) against joint (Sec. 3) and single (Sec. 4)
decoders for a given setup. We now start by introducing the notations
and the mathematical model needed to derive the WCA.
2. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
Random variables and their realizations are denoted by capital and
lowercase letters, respectively. Boldface letters denote column
vectors. Calligraphic letters are reserved for sets. PrX [x] is the
probability that the discrete random variable X takes the value x.
The shorthand [m] will be used to denote the sequence of indices
{1, . . . ,m}. H(.) is the entropy of a discrete random variable.
hb(x) = −x log(x)− (1−x) log(1−x) is the binary entropy func-
tion. DKL(PrX ||PrY ) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence or relative
entropy between the random variables X and Y . All logarithms are
to the base 2, so all rates and entropies are given in bits.
2.1. Binary probabilistic code with time-sharing
We briefly remind how the Tardos code is designed. The binary
code X is composed of n sequences ofm bits. The sequence Xj =
(X(j, 1), · · · , X(j,m))T identifying user j is composed of m in-
dependent binary symbols, with PrX(j,i)[1] = pi, ∀i ∈ [m]. The
auxiliary random variables {Pi}
m
i=1 are independent and identically
distributed in the range [0, 1] according to the probability density
function f : Pi ∼ f . Both the code X and the time-sharing sequence
p = (p1, . . . , pm)
T must remain as secret parameters. The rate of
the code is defined by R = log(n)/m.
This pdf f is of utmost importance. Tardos originally proposed
fT (p) = (π
p
p(1− p))−1, whereas [1, 2] showed that, against a
collusion of size c, the capacity achieving f⋆c (p) depends on c and is
indeed a probability mass function:
f⋆c (p) =
X
k∈[|Π(c)|]
wc,kδ(p− πc,k). (1)
The auxiliary variables are thus discrete and belong to the setΠ(c) =
{πc,k}k, a.k.a the support of f
⋆
c .
2.2. Collusion process
Denote the subset of colluder indices by C = {j1, · · · , jc}, and
XC = {Xj1 , . . . ,Xjc} the restriction of the code to this subset. The
collusion attack is the process of taking sequences in XC as inputs
and yielding the pirated sequence Y as an output.
The marking assumption [3] states that, in its narrow-sense ver-
sion, whatever the strategy of the collusion C, we have Y (i) ∈
{X(j1, i), · · · , X(jc, i)}. In words, colluders forge the pirated copy
by assembling chunks from their personal copies. It implies that if, at
index i, the colluders’ symbols are identical, then this symbol value
is decoded at the i-th chunk of the pirated copy.
The usual mathematical model of the collusion is essentially
based on four main assumptions: the collusion attack is memoryless,
stationary, possibly random, and permutation invariant (a.k.a. sym-
metric). The collusion attack is thus fully described by the following
parameter vector: θ = (θ0, . . . , θc)
T , with θσ = PrY [1|Σ = σ],
where the random variable Σ ∈ {0, . . . , c} denotes the number of
symbol ‘1’ in the colluders’ copies at a given index. The marking
assumption enforces that θ0 = 0 and θc = 1. The authors of [1] also
speak about ‘eligible channel’. We denoteΘ(c) the set of attacks for
a collusion of size c, which is a hypercube of dimension c− 1.
2.3. Decoding families
The study of traitor tracing codes from an achievable rate standpoint
largely decouples their performances from any particular decoding
algorithm. However, there exist two different families of decoders:
the simple decoder [4, Sec. 4] and the joint decoder [4, Sec. 5].
The simple decoder calculates a score from a user codeword and
the pirated sequence, whereas the joint decoder calculates a score
from a group of c user codewords and the pirated sequence. Due
to their different nature, the two families have different achievable
rates. Briefly, the joint decoder represents what the accusation side
could do in an ideal world where complexity is not a matter, and it
has been shown to be capacity-achieving. However, it has to tackle
(nc ) groups which seems hardly affordable for large n.
2.3.1. Joint decoder
The achievable rate for the joint decoder against a given collusion
attack is based on the mutual information between Y , a symbol of
the pirated sequence, and XC , the symbols of the colluders’ code
sequences [4, Sec. 5]. This holds for any index thanks to the symbol
independence, and this is taken in expectation over the time-sharing
random variable P :
Rjoint(f, θ) =
1
c
EP [I(Y ;XC |p, θ)]
=
1
c
(EP [H(Y |p, θ)]− EP [H(Y |Σ, p, θ)]) .(2)
Plugging the collusion model introduced in Sec. 2.2, we have:
PrY [1|p, θ] =
cX
σ=0
θσPrΣ[σ|p], (3)
PrY [1|σ, p, θ] = θσ, (4)
with PrΣ[σ|p] = (
c
σ) p
σ(1− p)(c−σ), known as the Bernstein poly-
nomials [5]. Therefore, Eq. (2) can be rewritten as:
Rjoint(f, θ) =
1
c
EP
"
hb (PrY [1|p, θ])−
cX
σ=0
PrΣ[σ|p]
#
hb(θσ).
(5)
2.3.2. Simple decoder
The achievable rate for the simple decoder against a given collusion
attack is given in [4, Sec. 4]:
Rsimple(f, θ) = EP [I(Y ;X|p, θ)]
= EP [H(Y |p, θ)]− EP [H(Y |X, p, θ)] (6)
= EP [DKL(PrX,Y ||PrXPrY |p, θ)] (7)
This links the notion of rate to the inherent capability of distinguish-
ing two hypothesis:
• H0: User j is innocent, and his codeword is independent of
Y : PrY,X|H0 = PrY |θPrX ,
• H1: User j is guilty and Y has been created from his code-
word: PrY,X|H1 = PrY |X,θPrX .
The calculation of the rate needs the expressions of the condi-
tional probabilities induced by the collusion model:
PrY [1|X = 1, p, θ] =
cX
k=1
θk
`
c−1
k−1
´
pk−1(1− p)(c−k), (8)
PrY [1|X = 0, p, θ] =
c−1X
k=0
θk
`
c−1
k
´
pk(1− p)(c−k−1). (9)
3. WCA AGAINST JOINT DECODERS
The recent works [1, 2] were able to find the capacity solving the
following game:
C(c) = max
f(p)
min
θ∈Θ(c)
Rjoint(f, θ).
The pay-off function Rjoint is linear in f and convex wrt θ. For a
given collusion size, the WCA against the optimum f⋆c was found
thanks to some specific properties only holding at the equilibrium of
the game. This section addresses a slightly different problem: for
any given pdf f and collusion size c, what is the WCA θ⋆c against a
joint decoder? The WCA is defined as follows:
θ
⋆
c = arg min
θ∈Θ(c)
Rjoint(f, θ) (10)
Rjoint(f, θ
⋆
c) is called the achievable rate in the sense that the code
designer can rely on a rate greater or equal to it, whatever the collu-
sion attack.
3.1. A Blahut-Arimoto algorithm
We resort now to the expression (2) of the joint decoding rate. The
problem of minimizing this function can be rewritten as a double
minimization, exactly like the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm for the
computation of the rate-distortion function [6]. The main difference
is that (10) corresponds to a degenerate problem because the only
distortion constraint is that θ ∈ Θ(c). The reader is referred to [6]
or [7, Chap. 13] for a detailed presentation of the Blahut-Arimoto
algorithm as we only explain its application to our model.
In a slight abuse of notation, let us denote the rhs of (5) by
r(PrY , θ). The WCA is disclosed by iteratively minimizing over
each argument of this function, keeping the other constant. Thus,
each iteration is comprised of two steps:
In the first step of the k-th iteration, for a fixed law q(k−1)(p) =
PrY [1|p, θ
(k−1)], we minimize r(q(k−1), θ) over θ. Thanks to its
convexity, the minimization amounts to canceling the (c− 1) partial
derivatives (θ0 and θσ are already fixed to 0 and 1, respectively):
∂r(q(k−1), θ)
∂θσ
∝ EP
»
PrΣ[σ|p] log
θσ(1− q
(k−1)(p))
q(k−1)(p)(1− θσ)
–
. (11)
By setting the last expression to 0, we obtain
θ(k)σ =
1
1 +B(k)(σ)
, σ = 1, . . . , c− 1, (12)
with
B(k)(σ) = exp
0
@EP
h
PrΣ[σ|p] log
1−q(k−1)(p)
q(k−1)(p)
i
EP [PrΣ[σ|p]]
1
A . (13)
B(k)(σ) is well defined because q(k−1)(p) = 0 only for p = 0 (resp.
q(k−1)(p) = 1 only for p = 1) where the polynomial PrΣ[σ|p] also
goes to zero. The denominator is not null because there exists a p ∈
]0, 1[ such that f(p) > 0 (else, the code generation is void). Finally,
Eq. (12) is always between 0 and 1, showing that the constraint θ ∈
Θ(c) is actually inactive.
The second step of the k-th iteration consists in updating the
function q(k)(p) with respect to the new collusion model θ(k) found
in the first step. This is done by finding the function q(k) minimizing
the functional r(q, θ(k)). We create an extension of the derivative of
this functional in q by a Taylor expansion of the difference
r(q + ǫ, θ(k))− r(q, θ(k)) = EP
"
∂r
∂q
˛˛˛
˛
q(p)
ǫ(p)
#
+ EP [o(ǫ(p))] .
The minimum is reached for a function q(k) such that any perturba-
tion ǫ doesn’t change the value of the functional at least up to the first
order. In other words, it cancels ∂r
∂q
˛˛˛
q(p)
. This leads to the following
update:
q(k)(p) =
cX
σ=0
θ(k)σ PrΣ[σ|p]. (14)
Very much like for the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm, convergence
to the WCA is monotonic, i.e. every step decreases the objective
function. Since the optimization problem is convex, convergence to
the worst θ⋆c is assured. We observe two surprising facts exposed
in the following propositions, whose proofs are in our journal arti-
cle [8].
Proposition 1. For a symmetric f (being it a continuous pdf or a
discrete pmf), the WCA is symmetric, i.e. θ∗σ = 1− θ
∗
c−σ, ∀σ ∈ [c].
Fig. 1. WCA against the joint decoder and Tardos pdf.
Table 1. Achievable rates for the joint decoder (in % wrt capacity).
c 2 3 4 5 6 7
C(c) 0.250 0.097 0.054 0.034 0.023 0.017
f⋆2 100 85.4 57.3 37.1 22.6 13.3
f⋆3 88.3 100 97.6 94.7 87.7 78.6
f⋆4 84.4 98.9 100 99.4 94.6 87.0
f⋆5 81.7 96.3 98.1 100 98.5 95.4
f⋆6 78.8 93.2 95.5 99.1 100 99.7
f⋆7 77.5 91.5 93.6 97.7 99.4 100
fF 77.6 88.4 87.8 89.3 89.2 88.7
fT 61.5 72.8 74.9 78.4 80.4 81.8
Therefore, the WCA for 2 colluders is θ⋆2 = (0, 0.5, 1)
T .
Proposition 2. The WCA is asymptotically the uniform (a.k.a inter-
leaving) attack as the number of colluders increases, for any contin-
uous density function f taking strictly positive values over ]0, 1[:
arg min
θ∈Θ(c)
Rjoint(f, θ)
c→+∞
= (0, 1/c, 2/c, . . . , 1)T .
Figure 1 illustrates the difference θ∗σ − σ/c for the Tardos pdf.
The WCA is quickly very close to the uniform attack, which is the
most simple collusion process: the colluders roll an unbiased c-face
dice to decider which symbol is paste in the pirated copy. Note that
Prop. 2 does not tackle discrete pmf f like those proposed in [1,
2]. However, in the discrete case, the same convergence has been
conjectured in [2].
3.2. Numerical results
This algorithm allows to calculate the achievable rate when there is a
mismatch between the collusion size cˆ expected by the designer and
the real number c of colluders. Tab. 1 shows the achievable rates as
a percentage of the capacity (for a given collusion size per column).
We also calculates the achievable rate given by two pdf not requiring
any bet on the collusion size: the Tardos pdf fT and the flat pdf fF .
We verify that f⋆cˆ yields the biggest achievable rate, ie. 100% of the
capacity, when c = cˆ. Except for f⋆2 , these distributions are quite
robust: in case of mismatch, the loss compared to the optimum is
surprisingly small. As proven in [2], the achievable rates for the Tar-
dos pdf slowly converge to capacity as c increases, but the difference
is substantial for small collusion. The flat pdf indeed gives a better
trade-off.
4. WCA AGAINST SIMPLE DECODERS
The problem of the simple decoder is much harder because the pay-
off function (7) is no longer convex in θ. As far as we know, there
is no result about the optimum pdf f⋆. This is not the aim of this
section. We are rather interested in the WCA for given pdf and col-
lusion size. However, this problem is still too difficult and we have
only partial results.
4.1. Continuous time-sharing distribution
We were only able to find the WCA thanks to a simulated annealing
minimization algorithm whose complexity is affordable when the
Fig. 2. plot of PrY [1|p, θ
⋆
c ], simple decoder, Tardos pdf.
collusion size is not too big: c ≤ 15. This allows us to formulate the
following conjectures.
Conjecture 1. For a symmetric f , the WCA is indeed symmetric,
i.e. θ∗σ = 1− θ
∗
c−σ, ∀σ ∈ [c].
We can prove this conjecture only for c = 2: the WCA for 2
colluders is θ⋆2 = (0, 0.5, 1)
T . This is the same attack as the WCA
against a joint decoder.
Conjecture 2. For the Tardos pdf fT , PrY [1|p, θ
⋆
c ] converges to
qconv(p) = (arcsin(2p − 1))/π + 1/2, as c increases. More
specifically, PrY [1|p, θ
⋆
c ] is the orthogonal projection of q
conv(p)
over the affine subspace spanned by the Bernstein polynomials
{PrΣ[σ|p]}σ∈[c−1] and containing PrΣ[c|p]:Z 1
0
(PrY [1|p, θ
⋆
c ]− q
conv(p))PrΣ[σ|p]dp = 0, ∀σ ∈ [c− 1].
We have to perform the projection of qconv(p) − PrΣ[c|p] onto
the linear subspace spanned by the Bernstein polynomials. The
Durrmeyer-Sevy algorithm is an elegant way to perform this or-
thogonal projection [5, Th. 2]. Fig. 2 shows the convergence of
PrY [1|p, θ
⋆
c ] as c increases.
4.2. Discrete time-sharing distribution
We first tackle the case of c = 2 colluders. The pay-off function
Rsimple(f, θ
⋆
2) reaches its maximum in p = 1/2. If the optimum
pdf for a single decoder is symmetric, then f⋆2 (p) = δ(p − 1/2) is
the optimum and θ⋆2 the WCA for both decoding families. This only
holds for the special case of two colluders, but this brings a theo-
retical support to the code recently proposed by Nuida [9], which is
a fully randomized code with PrXi,j [1] = 1/2, ie. a Tardos code
tuned on f⋆2 .
According to (7), the achievable rate of a single decoder
is the weighted sum of mutual informations knowing p in the
support Π(c). We first study when the colluders can cancel
the summand I(Y ;X|p, θ). This goal is reached by setting
PrY [1|X = 1, p] = PrY [1|X = 0, p]. Since these probabilities
are linear with θ, it amounts to finding a collusion attack θ ∈ Θ(c)
such that
θ
T (qΣ1(p)− qΣ0(p)) = 0, (15)
with
qΣ1(p) = (PrΣ[0|X = 1, p], . . . , PrΣ[c|X = 1, p])
T
(16)
qΣ0(p) = (PrΣ[0|X = 0, p], . . . , PrΣ[c|X = 0, p])
T . (17)
Proposition 3. c colluders cannot cancel I(Y ;X|p, θ) if p /∈
[ηc, 1 − ηc], with 1/c < ηc < 2/c the smallest real root of the
following polynomial
(1− p)c−2(1− cp) + pc−1. (18)
Proof. Since the scalar product is linear, θT (qΣ1 − qΣ0) can be
written as a convex combination of the scalar products ρi(p) =
eTi+1(qΣ1 − qΣ0), with ei+1 the (i+ 1)-th canonical vector:
ρi(p) = (
c
i ) p
i−1(1− p)c−i−1(i/c− p), ∀i ∈ [c].
Note that ρ1(p) is the only one producing negative values over the
interval [1/c, 2/c]. Therefore, on this interval, we have:
ρ1(p) + ρc(p) ≤ θ
T (qΣ1 − qΣ0),
with equality if θ = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0, 1)T .
For c = 3, ρ1(p) + ρ3(p) = (2p − 1)
2 ≥ 0. It is not pos-
sible to find any vector θ ∈ Θ(3), except for p = 1/2 with θ =
(0, 1, 0, 1)T .
For c > 3, the lower bound ρ1(p) + ρc(p) = (1 − p)
c−2(1 −
cp) + pc−1 is strictly positive for p ∈ [0, 1/c] and negative for p ∈
[2/c, 1/2]. Therefore, there exists some ηc ∈ [1/c, 2/c] such that,
for p < ηc, it is impossible to cancel I(Y ;X|p, θ).
The same rationale holds on the interval [1−2/c, 1−1/c], where
all the scalar products have negative values except ρc−1(p), hence a
lower bound is:
c−2X
i=1
ρi(p) + ρc(p) ≤ θ
T (qΣ1 − qΣ0)
We can simplify the lower bound into: pc−2(1 − c(1 − p)) + (1 −
p)c−1, which is the symmetric version of the first bound ρ1(p) +
ρc(p). For p > 1 − ηc, the mutual information cannot be canceled.
Although it is not possible to obtain analytically the exact value
of ηc, it can be approximated by ηc ≈ 1/c. This approximation is
asymptotically tight as c is increased.
A corollary of this proposition is that, for c ≥ 3, the achievable
rate for the pmf f⋆2 (p) = δ(p− 1/2) might be null. It is indeed the
case for c = 3 and a minority vote. The following proposition shows
this propagates as c increases.
Proposition 4. If c colluders can cancel the achievable rate with the
attack θc, then c + 1 colluders can achieve the same goal with the
following attack θc+1:
θc+1,σ =
σ
c+ 1
θc,σ−1 +
c+ 1− σ
c+ 1
θc,σ, ∀σ ∈ [c]. (19)
Proof. We only give the sketch of the proof. The attack of the c
colluders cancel the rate, thus it cancels the mutual informations
I(Y ;X|π, θ(c)), ∀π ∈ Π(c). Since, in general,
PrY [1|X = 1, p, θ] = PrY [1|p, θ] +
(1− p)
c
∂
∂p
PrY [1|p, θ]
PrY [1|X = 0, p] = PrY [1|p, θ]−
p
c
∂
∂p
PrY [1|p, θ], (20)
therefore this attack sets ∂
∂p
PrY [1|π, θc] = 0, ∀π ∈ Π(c). Some
trivial math shows that (19) leads to:
∂
∂p
PrY [1|π, θc+1] =
∂
∂p
PrY [1|π, θc] = 0
The interpretation of (19) is quite easy: The c + 1 colluders
uniformly pick up and exclude one of their symbols and they lead
the attack θc with the remaining c symbols. If they had σ ‘1’ over
c+ 1 symbols, the probability that there remain σ − 1 ‘1’ (resp. σ)
over c equals σ/(c + 1) (resp. 1 − σ/(c + 1)). This proposition
explains the series of null rates in Tab. 2.
Table 2. Achievable rates for the single decoder (in %).
c 2 3 4 5 6 7
R¯(c) 0.189 0.059 0.034 0.016 0.011 0.008
f⋆2 100 0 0 0 0 0
f⋆3 88.5 50.1 30.0 9.5 0.0 0
f⋆4 84.6 77.2 67.2 24.3 1.0 0
f⋆5 82.1 95.3 94.1 54.2 16.0 6.0
f⋆6 79.4 100 100 84.5 48.1 29.5
f⋆7 78.3 98.3 98.8 100 77.5 55.6
fF 78.2 76.1 76.5 86.7 86.3 84.6
fT 78.2 80.7 81.5 97.2 100 100
Π(cˆ) ⊂ [ηc, 1 − ηc] is a necessary condition for canceling the
rate, but it is not sufficient. This goal is indeed achieved if the inter-
section between the definition set Θ(c) and the hyperplane defined
by (15) taken in all p ∈ Π(cˆ) is not the emptyset. For instance,Π(3)
and Π(4) have only 2 elements and Θ(3) has only two degrees of
freedom. Therefore the hyperplane for c = 3 is just a point (a full
rank system of 2 equations and 2 unknowns). It appears that this
point is not in Θ(3). The hyperplane needs a bigger dimension, ie.
more colluders, to finally intersects withΘ(3) and to cancel the rate.
4.3. Achievable rates
To be consistent with Sec. 3, we denote R¯(c) the maximum achiev-
able rate against c colluders over the 8 tested pdf of Table 1. Table 2
shows the achievable rates as a percentage of R¯(c). Remember that
f⋆cˆ is the optimal pdf for the joint decoder. As far as we know, the
optimal pdf for the single decoder hasn’t been discovered except for
2 colluders. Contrary to the joint decoder, a mismatch between the
expected number of colluder and its actual value is a big issue. The
single decoder sees his rate vanishing very fast as c increases if f is
a pmf. Note, however, that a big number of foreseen colluders cˆ im-
plies a pmf f⋆cˆ with a large support. Amiri and Tardos give the lower
bound: |Π(cˆ)| ≥
q
cˆ
4 ln 2 log cˆ
. Therefore, even more colluders are
needed to cancel the single decoder rate. From c = 6 colluders, the
best pdf we tested is the choice originally made by Tardos.
5. CONCLUSION
As a final remark, we would like to stress that a joint decoder has
a higher but also more stable rate than the single decoder. There-
fore, the importance of the capacity achieving function f⋆cˆ is strictly
conditioned on the existence of a joint decoder with affordable com-
plexity. A more realistic goal would be to trade high and stable rates
against less computing power. If this is not possible, then continuous
pdf such as the flat or the Tardos pdf seems to be more secure.
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